

12th Annual Pacific IO & EW Symposium

October 16-20, 2023 | Honolulu, HI | Camp H.M. Smith, HI

SYMPOSIUM THEME

The theme for the 2023 IO & EW Symposium, “Implementing Integrated Deterrence One Year On: Are We There Yet?,” picks up from last year’s symposium’s focus on understanding integrated deterrence, and implementing it as part of the 2022 National Defense Strategy. This year’s theme will focus on assessing our progress we have made since our last symposium on the integration and implementation of deterrence concepts and efforts among like-minded Allies and Partners.

Why a continued focus on integrated deterrence?

At the 11th Annual IO & EW Symposium last year, participants received eighteen presentations and a distinguished panel, specifically focused on implementing *integrated deterrence* as called for in the National Defense Strategy (NDS). These were accompanied by another nine presentations, a senior leader roundtable, and two senior leader panels that focused on operations, intelligence support, threat assessments, emerging doctrine, C2 tools, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum operations, and countering disinformation, all with a focus on deterrence. One year later, it is time to assess if we have made any progress with implementing integrated deterrence.

Our senior leaders have been telling us that we don’t have much time to get this done right. Speaking to Fox News, GEN, Ret. Jack Keane assessed on May 1, 2023 that “there has been an erosion of military deterrence in the [Indo-Pacific] region.”¹ This is supported by other senior leaders to include Admiral Phil Davidson, former Commander of USINDOPACOM, who reiterated in January of this year that Communist China may try to invade Taiwan by 2027.² General Michael Minihan, former Director of Operations J3, Chief of Staff, and Deputy Commander of PACOM and INDOPACOM assessed that “China will invade Taiwan in 2025.”³ Taiwan’s Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng had also assessed that the PRC will have the capability to mount a full-scale invasion by 2025,⁴ and General Paul E. Funk stated that China would pose significant strategic challenge starting in 2025.⁵ Our deterrence efforts are not something that we can get around to later, ***we need to mount effective and integrated deterrence now.***

How do we measure success in achieving integrated deterrence?

The DoD’s 2006 Joint Operating Concept for Deterrence explains that assessment of deterrence operations requires us to “assess effectiveness of deterrent actions during and after

execution” and includes measuring “adversary response to deterrent actions” and to “measure trends over time.”⁶ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Concept for Competing, signed February 20, 2023, calls for continuous campaign assessments, wherein assessments of deterrence should be a component.⁷ This symposium provides us an opportunity to hear from experts on how we should approach conducting operational assessments of our integration of deterrence efforts within the DoD, the US Government, and Allies and Partners against Communist China and north Korea. What is the evidence that we can collect, categorize, measure, and assess that will tell us whether we are winning or losing the ‘deterrence fight’ against our primary adversaries? How do we account for positive and negative effects of DoD led deterrence/assurance efforts, as well as those conducted by the US Government outside the DoD, and those of our Allies and partners? For this symposium, we are asking for practitioners, academicians and scientists with expertise in the field to offer answers to this question.

Deterring both Conventional War and Gray Zone Actions and Coercion.

This was a complicated focus area for last year’s symposium, and one that remains so for our planners today. The NDS directs DoD to deter gray zone actions and coercion, and after more than a year since its publication, we can compare notes on how well the CCMDs are deterring adversaries from conducting gray zone actions and coercion in our assigned AORs through the campaigning activities of their component commands. The CJCS 2018 Concept for Campaigning⁸ and the 2023 Concept for Competing, both provide useful constructs focused on deterring grayzone actions.

Ally and Partner Contributions

Recall that Secretary Austin’s remarks from last year that what was “most important” for the success of integrated deterrence is “using the capability and capacity that’s resident in our partners and allies.”⁹ Over the last three years, we have seen how the PRC’s patterns of coercion, bullying, ‘wolf warrior diplomacy,’ malign influence, gray zone actions, and support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have caused nations to re-assess the threat that Communist China poses globally. Former Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, ADM Phil Davidson noted this trend in January 2021, remarking that China’s political, economic and military aggressiveness was driving Asian countries toward closer ties with the United States.¹⁰ The effect noted by ADM Davidson regarding reaction to PRC aggression extends outside of the Indo-Pacific, as even NATO has declared at the June 2022 NATO conference in Madrid that Communist China’s aggression, ambitions, and its “coercive policies” present a threat to the NATO member countries’ “interests, security and values.”¹¹ This was the first time in the history of NATO that its guiding policy document addressed the Chinese Communist threat. NATO members committed to “work together responsibly, as Allies, to address the systemic

challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security.”¹² NATO also stressed the need to increase cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific region to meet NATO resilience guidelines and to maintain NATO’s technological lead.”¹³ The Atlantic Council has recommended that among the actions necessary to fulfill this commitment is for NATO to reduce dependencies on Communist China in its defense supply chain, and to “demonstrate support for U.S. efforts to deter war with China, but also to prepare for the worst.”¹⁴ NATO will expand cooperation with Asia-Pacific partners including Japan, South Korea and Australia.¹⁵

In the Indo-Pacific theater, Japan has taken significant steps to address the military threat from Communist China in its December 2022 National Security Strategy. The new strategy explains that “Japan will strongly oppose China's growing attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force... [and will] reinforce its own capabilities and roles, and together with its ally, the United States, and like-minded countries and others, deter contingencies and attempts to unilaterally change the status quo in Japan and its vicinity. If by any chance a threat should reach Japan, Japan will disrupt and defeat the threat.”¹⁶ Japan “will build a multilayered network among its ally and like-minded countries, expand it, and strengthen deterrence. Thus, while utilizing frameworks such as the Japan-U.S.-ROK, and Japan-U.S.-Australia, Japan will enhance security cooperation with Australia, India, the ROK, European countries, ASEAN countries, Canada, NATO, EU, and others.”¹⁷ Japan has already made steps in this direction, to include its recent commitment to open a NATO liaison office in Tokyo.¹⁸

Similarly, the Philippines is reassessing its posture to counter the Communist Chinese threat to the stability and security of the region. At the April 11, 2023 US-Philippines 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, the US secretaries of State and Defense met with their counterparts, and issued a joint statement in which the two parties reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of global security and prosperity.¹⁹ The Philippines also recently nearly doubled the number of bases to which U.S. military forces are granted access under the 2014 Philippine-U.S. Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA).²⁰ As a demonstration of the seriousness of American efforts to integrate deterrence, ADM Gilday, Chief of Naval Operations, during a visit to the Philippines on February 22 of this year offered to conduct joint maritime patrols with Philippines’ Navy to counter Communist Chinese coercion.²¹ This followed Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s commitment following the Chinese Coast Guard’s laser blinding attack on February 6, 2023 in the South China Sea (SCS) that any “an armed attack on Philippine armed forces, aircraft, and public vessels, including those of its Coast Guard, anywhere in the South China Sea, would invoke U.S. mutual defense commitments under Article IV of the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.”²² Demonstrating the strength of this alliance is the largest-ever bilateral Exercise “Balikitan” in April 2023, which saw more than 17,600 American, Filipino and Australian sailors, Marines, soldiers and airmen participate in the exercise.²³

As our Allies and partners make the necessary national-strategic policy decisions to defend themselves against Communist Chinese aggression, they create opportunities to integrate bilaterally and multi-laterally the deterrence architecture, concepts, and strategies needed to curb PRC's expansionist moves and threats to its neighbors. As the 2023 Concept for Competing explains "Effective relationships with inter-organizational and international partners offers the expansion of capabilities, authorities, and posture options"²⁴ all of which improve collective deterrence posture. However, as described in the opening of his call for papers, the window for achieving integrated deterrence with Allies and Partners is closing, and the U.S. and her allies and partners will need to be prepared to move quickly once bilateral planning is allowed to ensure strategies are aligned.

The Challenge Ahead

Integrating deterrence planning across the U.S. DoD and U.S. Government will be hard work. Integrating deterrence with Allies and Partners adds another layer of complexity. Using the example of Japan, Mike Watson points out in his article for the National Review that while Japan recognizes the continue security of Taiwan as key to Japan's security that practically speaking "there is almost no coordination between the Americans, Japanese, and Taiwanese, who would have to fight together to stave off a Chinese offensive."²⁵ LTC, Ret. Andrew Krepinevich Jr. has written that deterrence strategies and planning is more complicated in today's multi-polar world than it was during the Cold War, and that in the face of current geopolitical and military-technical environments the effectiveness of deterrence strategies is declining as the probability of failure increases with a growing number of near-peer and major adversaries.²⁶ The CJCS 2023 Joint Concept for Competing explains that U.S. adversaries "intend to pursue their objectives while avoiding armed conflict, rendering traditional Joint Force deterrence less effective."²⁷ Given that deterrence planning and execution will be more difficult, it will be very important to implement consistent assessment methods across the DoD, to determine if we are, in fact, deterring our adversaries. How will the staff accomplish this important function?

The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) laid the foundation for integrated deterrence, explaining that "integrated actions with allies will demonstrate our commitment to deterring aggression."²⁸ Implementing effective and integrated deterrence is one of the priority tasks in the 2022 NDS.²⁹ The 2022 NDS states "Deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary - prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific region, then the Russia challenge in Europe."³⁰ The 2022 U.S. National Military Strategy explains that the central military problem facing the U.S. is "how the Joint Force will rapidly develop future warfighting advantage ***while deterring effectively today.***"³¹ GEN Mark Milley, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his forward to the National Military Strategy, reminds us "The current

environment requires the Joint Force ***to strengthen and integrate deterrence across all domains, theaters, and the spectrum of conflict...assure allies and partners***, and prepare to prevail in great power conflict...the window to seize the strategic initiative is now...***Adapt Now, or Lose Later.***³²

CALL FOR PRESENTATIONS

USINDOPACOM J39 and the AOC are soliciting original unclassified English language presentations and/or papers for the 12th Pacific IO & EW Symposium from subject matter experts in the U.S. and Allied militaries / government, as well as from academia and industry on the conference theme. Presentations for the full plenary session in the first three days of symposium must be UNCLASSIFIED, and for US Government organizations, carry the Distribution Statement A, "Public Release." Presentations for the classified plenary sessions at Camp Smith should be at the SECRET REL TO USA, TO USA, DEU, FRA, JPN, KOR, FVEY level, or at higher classification for smaller group break-out sessions in other conference rooms at Camp Smith.

Potential Speakers are invited to note the conference sessions topics and specific areas of interest:

- * Studies of, and lessons learned on recent deterrence successes and failures.
- * Applicable lessons learned from historical deterrence operations and campaigns (e.g. Cold War deterrence of the Communist Bloc).
- * The challenges and military options for effectively deterring Gray Zone actions and coercion.
- * Analysis of adversary and potential adversary deterrence strategies and concepts.
- * Assessment of the execution of integrated deterrence strategies via campaigning.
- * Experimentation, Exercises and Training that would improve execution of the deter/assure components of the 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy, the 2022 NDS, and the 2022 NMS.

Please contact the Symposium Chair, Dr. Arthur Tulak, COL USA, Ret, at arthur.n.tulak.ctr@us.navy.mil if you are interested in speaking or want more information and provide the title of the proposed paper, a brief synopsis, and biography of the speaker. Industry presentations that support the conference theme may be submitted for either the unclassified or classified plenaries. Industry presentations must focus on the symposium theme and should not simply be product-focused. The deadline for submitting is close of business Thursday, July 20, 2023, but earlier is better.

End Notes:

- ¹ Remarks of GEN Ret. Jack Keane, Fox Business News, May, 1, 2023, “Gen. Jack Keane on why tension with China exists,” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E3ZUrvlGmII>
- ² Miya Tanaka, Kyodo News, - January 23, 2023, “Ex-U.S. Indo-Pacific commander sticks to 2027 window on Taiwan attack. <https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2023/01/018a26a02962-ex-us-indo-pacific-commander-sticks-to-2027-window-on-taiwan-attack.html> See also his earlier assessment while still serving as the INDOPACOM Commander: Mallory Shelbourne, March 9, 2021, “Davidson: China Could Try to Take Control of Taiwan In ‘Next Six Years’ (by 2027). <https://news.usni.org/2021/03/09/davidson-china-could-try-to-take-control-of-taiwan-in-next-six-years>
- ³ Mary Kay Linge, January 28, 2023, “US Air Force Gen. Mike Minihan predicts China war in 2025,” *New York Post*, <https://nypost.com/2023/01/28/us-air-force-gen-mike-minihan-predicts-china-war-in-2025/>
- ⁴ Helen Davidson, Julian Borger, October 6, 2021, “China could mount full-scale invasion by 2025, Taiwan defence minister says,” *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/06/biden-says-he-and-chinas-xi-have-agreed-to-abide-by-taiwan-agreement>
- ⁵ GEN Paul E. Funk, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *The Operational Environment (2021-2030): Great Power Competition, Crisis, and Conflict*, 357. [The Operational Environment \(2021-2030\): Great Power Competition, Crisis, and Conflict | Mad Scientist Laboratory \(army.mil\)](https://www.army.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joint_concept_integrated_campaign.pdf?ver=2018-03-28-102833-257)
- ⁶ Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0 December 2006, pp. 53-54. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA490279.pdf>
- ⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, February 10, 2023, p. 38. https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/joint-concept-competing?utm_source=pocket_saves
- ⁸ CJCS, March 16, 2018, Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joint_concept_integrated_campaign.pdf?ver=2018-03-28-102833-257
- ⁹ Jim Garamone, (February 18, 2022), “Austin Says Current Operations Give Hints of New National Defense Strategy,” DOD NEWS, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2940956/austin-says-current-operations-give-hints-of-new-national-defense-strategy/>
- ¹⁰ John M. Doyle (January 15, 2021), “INDO-PAC Commander Says Chinese Aggressiveness Helps U.S. Make More Friends,” *Seapower magazine*. <https://seapowermagazine.org/indo-pac-commander-says-chinese-aggressiveness-helps-u-s-make-more-friends/>
- ¹¹ Al Jazeera, June 30, 2022, “NATO declares China a security challenge for the first time,” [NATO declares China a security challenge for the first time | Politics News | Al Jazeera](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/30/nato-declares-china-a-security-challenge-for-the-first-time)
- ¹² Hans Binnendijk and Daniel S. Hamilton, “Implementing NATO’s Strategic Concept on China,” Atlantic Council, p. 12 <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/implementing-natos-strategic-concept-on-china/>
- ¹³ Ibid, p. 12.
- ¹⁴ Ibid, p. 14.
- ¹⁵ NATO, April 11, 2023, ‘Relations with partners in the Indo-Pacific region’ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_183254.htm
- ¹⁶ Japan National Security strategy, https://www.mod.go.jp/i/policy/agenda/guideline/pdf/security_strategy_en.pdf
- ¹⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁸ Reuters, May 9, 2022, “Japan working towards opening of NATO liaison office in Tokyo,” <https://www.reuters.com/world/japan-working-towards-opening-nato-liaison-office-tokyo-2023-05-09/>
- ¹⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan, April 22, 2023, “MOFA response to US-Philippines 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue on April 11,” https://en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=1328&s=100114

²⁰ Renato Cruz De Castro Thursday, March 9, 2023, 'The Philippines' evolving view on Taiwan: From passivity to active involvement.' The number of bases increased from 5 to 9. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2023/03/09/the-philippines-evolving-view-on-taiwan-from-passivity-to-active-involvement/>

²¹ Joe Gould, "Pacific Posturing: China's neighbors seek expanded partnerships with US forces to deter and defend," *Defense News*, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 44-47.

²² Department of Defense, February 21, 2023, Carlito Galvez, Press Release, "Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III's Call With Philippine Senior Undersecretary and Officer in Charge of the Department of National Defense," <https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3304564/readout-of-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iiis-call-with-philippine-senior/>

²³ Rene Acosta and John Grady, April 11, 2023, "U.S., Philippines Kick off Largest-ever Balikatan Exercise as Defense, Foreign Affairs Leaders Meet in Washington," U.S. Naval Institute, <https://news.usni.org/2023/04/11/u-s-philippines-kick-off-largest-ever-balikatan-exercise-as-defense-foreign-affairs-leaders-meet-in-washington>

²⁴ CJCS, February 10, 2023, Joint Concept for Competing, op. cit., p. 33.

²⁵ Mike Watson, December 30, 2022, "Japan Wakes Up," *National Review*, Vol. LXXIV, No. 24, pp. 19-21.

²⁶ Andrew Krepinevich Jr., March 12, 2019, "The Decline of Deterrence," The Hudson Institute, p. 7, <https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/the-decline-of-deterrence>

²⁷ CJCS, February 10, 2023, Joint Concept for Competing, op. cit., p. 38.

²⁸ Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>

²⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy, <https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/28/2002964702/-1/-1/1/NDS-FACT-SHEET.PDF>

³⁰ Department of Defense, October 27, 2022, National Defense Strategy, <https://www.defense.gov/National-Defense-Strategy/>

³¹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, May 8, 2023, The Pentagon, p. 2. Emphasis added. <https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/NMS%202022%20-%20Signed.pdf>

³² Ibid, p. 1. Emphasis added.